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ACQUIRING JUDGES BY THE MERIT
SELECTION METHOD: THE CASE FOR
ADOPTING SUCH A METHOD
by
Norman Krivosha

Charms strike the sight, but merit wins the soul.1

EXACTLY

eighty years ago, Roscoe Pound, in delivering his now famous 1906 address to the American Bar Association, said in part:
"Putting courts into politics and compelling judges to become politicians, in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the traditional respect for
the bench."'2 It appears that the passage of time has done little, if anything,
to refute the observations made by Pound in 1906. Fortunately, the advent
of the merit selection system now employed by many states in selecting
judges has, to a large extent, removed the judiciary from the political arena.
Under a pure merit selection system, a bipartisan commission chooses a slate
of qualified candidates from which the executive branch selects. A careful
comparison of those jurisdictions in which judges are popularly elected with
those jurisdictions in which merit selection is employed will disclose that the
popular election of judges has not provided the citizenry with any meaningful benefits, while the merit selection system has minimized many of the
problems involved in attempting to create an independent and responsible
judiciary.
Part of the difficulty in deciding which of the two systems, elected versus
appointed, should be employed is brought about by reason of our failing or,
perhaps worse, refusing to understand the role of the judiciary in a democratic society. In many jurisdictions the election of judges is considered to
be the only "democratic" way of creating a judiciary. This notion of an
elected judiciary has not always prevailed in America. Initially, following
the American Revolution, judges were appointed. The advent of the Jacksonian era and its emphasis on democratic populous ideals, however, promoted
and instilled in the hearts and minds of Americans the notion that everyone,
including judges, should be popularly elected and subject to the will of the
people. 3 Yet, by considering the judiciary in the same light as the executive
1. Alexander Pope, The Rape of the Lock, in THE POETRY OF POPE: A SELECTION 44
(Abrams ed. 1954).
2. Pound, The Cause of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 46
JUDICATURE 66 (1962).
3. Percy, Should State Judges be Elected or Appointed?, 31 LA. B.J. 274 (1984).
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and legislative branches of government, we miss the entire point and purpose
of a judicial branch of government. It is not that judges are better than those
who hold office in the other two branches of government and for that reason
should not be subject to the will of the people. Rather, to suggest that a
judge's decisions should be subject to review by the populace is to fail to
understand the duties and functions of a judge.
It makes perfectly good sense in a free, democratic society to suggest that
the people's representatives occupying the legislative branch of government
should be selected by the people whom they are to represent. Likewise, it
makes perfectly good sense to suggest that the head of the executive branch
of government should be selected by the people whom he or she represents.
It makes no sense at all to talk about representation when examining the
judicial branch of government. Legislators have constituents and, therefore,
should be popularly elected. Governors have constituents and, therefore,
should also be popularly elected. Judges are prohibited by law from having
constituents; 4 therefore, subjecting them to popular election is totally without reason.
One need only study the life cycle of a state law to quickly recognize the
fallacy of a popularly elected judiciary. Assume that a bill is introduced
before a state legislature. One hundred opponents, wishing to have the bill
killed not because it is illegal but only because it is contrary to their wishes,
may very appropriately hire a bus, drive to the state capitol, and caucus with
their respective representatives. They may advise their representatives that
the bill is contrary to their best interests and urge each representative to vote
against the bill. They may even threaten each representative that should he
or she fail to vote against the bill, these 100 and many more will publicly
campaign against the representative when next he or she seeks public office,
advising the populace that the representative voted in favor of the legislation
though it was not in the best interests of a particular group. Should the
legislator, however, determine that those 100 people do not represent the
majority who elected the representative to office, he or she may decide to
vote for the bill notwithstanding this display of opposition. This simply reflects the democratic form of government. Citizens have a right to at least
attempt to persuade members of the legislative branch of government to respond to the will of the people.
Likewise, if the bill is passed, and sent to the governor for signature, these
same 100 people can properly once again board their bus, come back to the
capitol, and caucus with the governor in an effort to persuade the governor
to veto the bill. They can frankly tell the governor that they are not concerned about the legality of the bill, and that all they care about is that the
bill is contrary to their best interests. They may even threaten the governor
that if he or she does not veto the bill, when the governor seeks reelection to
office, not only will the governor not have the support of this interest group,
but this interest group will spend time and money actively seeking the gover4.

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 3 (1972).
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nor's defeat. If the governor determines that the individuals do not represent a significant majority, the governor may, nevertheless, sign the bill.
Once again, this is democracy in action.
If after the legislature passes the bill and the governor signs the bill into
law, however, one wishes to attack the constitutionality of that law, a different situation develops. Assume that the law is now under attack in the state
supreme court. Once again those 100 individuals travel to the state capital
to meet with the chief justice for the purpose of attempting to convince him
or her that unless the chief justice commits to them that the court will declare the act unconstitutional, these 100 will actively campaign against the
chief justice when next he or she seeks public office. What is the reaction of
the public if they learn that the chief justice, being a more astute politician
than either the representative or the governor, recognizes that these 100 people have much to offer and agrees that when the court sits to hear argument
it will declare the act unconstitutional? In return for that commitment, the
chief justice simply requests that when next he or she runs for reelection this
group not only will provide significant financial support, but will also work
hard for the chief justice's reelection.
The end of this scenario may seem unreal and outlandish; surely no one
would attempt to so pressure a court, and no group would attempt to travel
to the court for that purpose. If it is true that no group would so attempt to
pressure a court nor make its will known, why subject the decision-maker to
the will of the people by requiring a judge to be popularly elected?
Webster defines "judge" as "one that judges" and defines "judging" as the
act of "deciding on the merits a matter." 5 Nowhere in that definition does
the will of the people play any part at all. To suggest that somehow it is
appropriate to hold judges accountable to the will of the people when the
will of the people has nothing to do with their function is like suggesting that
the public periodically vote on whether a geriatrics specialist who does
everything medically proper, but whose patient dies because of old age,
should be permitted to continue practicing medicine. A judge who decides a
case, not upon the merits but, rather, upon what he perceives to be the will
of the majority, is subject not only to ridicule but also to removal from office. 6 Why, then, should we on the one hand, suggest that it is unethical to
decide cases solely because the decision is popular though legally incorrect
and, on the other hand, base the judge's right to continue serving upon
whether his or her decisions are popular with the people, even though they
may be contrary to the requirements of law? Unless and until that dichotomy in reasoning is resolved, no basis for popularly electing judges makes
sense.
Even assuming that judges should somehow be sensitive to the will of the
people, how does a judge or, more particularly, a collegial court, determine
the will of the people? Imagine what the reaction would be if a chief justice
in preparing an annual budget sought appropriations for the purpose of periWEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1968).
6. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(c) (1972).
5.
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odically retaining pollsters to assist the court in determining the will of the
people. Imagine the reaction of the people if they should receive a survey in
the mail advising them that three weeks hence the court will pass on the
constitutionality of a newly-enacted tax law, and, in advance of that decision, the court would be grateful if the citizens receiving the survey would
advise the court how they felt about the matter and how the court should
decide the case. And if, once again, it is suggested that such action is obviously ridiculous, then how is the court to know what is the will of the
people?
The examples that have been given here are nonsensical. If, however,
courts are not supposed to pay attention to the will of the people, even if
they could know and determine the will of the people, then a system that
brings judges to office and implicitly requires them to know the will of the
people and act in accordance therewith is equally nonsensical. The process
of selecting a judge should produce an individual who, like a referee in a
sporting event, will serve as an impartial arbitrator, willing to set aside his or
her own individual views and the views held by the populace in order to
decide the matter based upon the merits in accordance with existing law. 7
The notion is accepted that a referee in a basketball game must call the
fouls in accordance with the rules, whether or not the public likes the rules
and whether or not the majority present supports the team against whom the
foul is called. To subject each call to a vote of the fans in the audience would
obviously make for chaos. The analogy to the judicial branch of government
is obvious. Popular election of judges has little relationship to good judgment or to the question of whether a judge has faithfully followed his or her
oath and, therefore, should be retained in office.
By permitting the popular election of judges, the public fails to understand
that judges do not make decisions based upon their views or the views of the
public but, rather, on the law's view on the matter. If the law is unpopular,
then it is incumbent upon the people to persuade their representatives in the
other two branches of government to change the law. That is where the
public pressure properly should be applied. Unless and until the public succeeds in convincing the other two branches of government to bring about a
change, the judicial branch is dutybound to follow the law.
It is a popular notion these days to want judges who are "strict constructionists." The term "activist judge" is often used as a denigrating label. Yet,
even if a judge strictly construes the law and thereby reaches a result that is
unpopular, that judge often is subject to public criticism and the threat of
ouster from office. One should not be permitted to run against an incumbent
judge on the promise that he or she will ignore the law and abide by the will
of the people. For an individual seeking election to judicial office to promise
in advance how he or she will decide a case without first hearing the evidence is completely improper.8 Such a legal system would result in chaos in
this country.
7.
8.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 1 (1972).
Canon 3 (1972).
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How, then, has the system worked as well as it has in those jurisdictions
that continue to elect judges? It has worked simply because in those jurisdictions where judges are popularly elected, most often judges are "selected"
to office, but without merit. The noted jurist and legal scholar Arthur Vanderbilt observed that the only thing that has saved the popular election of
judges in America is the fact that most often they are initially appointed to
fill a vacancy and thereafter run unopposed. 9 Thus, to suggest that such a
system is any different in effect than a merit selection system is, of course,
false. The only difference is that in the popular election of judges a bipartisan commission, which is generally found in the merit selection system, has
no voice in culling out the unqualified by compelling the executive branch to
select from a list of qualified candidates.
In 1979 the jurisdictions that had merit selection systems were polled by
the American Judicature Society. Almost without exception, the conclusion
was that the quality of the bench had improved by reason of a state adopting
the merit selection system. 10 That result should not seem strange. Relatively
few successful practitioners, that is, senior partners of large firms, are willing
to sacrifice a year or more in campaigning for office without knowing
whether they will be elected even after all the time and resources that have
been invested. Not only is there the matter of expense, but, more importantly, there is the concern on the part of the candidate that by seeking the
office, the individual may cause alarm among his or her clients. As a result,
it is seldom that an experienced lawyer throws his or her hat into the political ring.
Moreover, there is no question but that the merit selection system affords
greater opportunities for women and minorities to find their way to the
bench. To be sure, one may find women and minority judges in jurisdictions
that elect. Nevertheless, experience discloses that the merit selection system
will more rapidly provide women and minorities with opportunity than will
the election process."
Another matter of grave concern, which is seldom discussed when one
compares the merit selection system to the popular election system, is the
issue of campaign funds. How does a judge collect campaign funds without
creating the appearance of impropriety? One may be the most ethical individual in the world and, yet, if one must seek funds as the other two
branches of government do when running for office, one inevitably creates
the appearance of impropriety. It is nearly impossible in today's costly election process to be able to garner the kind of dollars necessary for statewide
election without becoming identified with various interest groups. How does
9. Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors: Their Functions, Qualifications and Selection, 36

B.U.L.

REV.

1, 37 (1956).

10. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection Update: How Commissioners Rate
Their Own Judicial Selection Plans (1979) (paper presented at conference, Merit Selection
1979: Merit Selection of Judges ... How Is It Working?, sponsored by American Judicature

Society, Institute of Judicial Administration, and Fund for Modern Courts, Inc.).
11. Fund for Modern Courts, Inc., Success of Women and Minorities in Achieving Judicial Office: The Selection Process (Dec. 1985).
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a judge maintain his or her appearance of impartiality and propriety if he or
she is identified as a "labor judge" or as a "management judge" or as a
"plaintiff's judge" or as a "defendant's judge?"
Another serious question is from whom are the funds to be solicited? Obviously, one must solicit from all lawyers practicing before the court. All
lawyers, obviously, want to contribute to the campaign of a sitting judge!
And what of litigants? May one solicit funds, even through a committee,
from individuals who have cases pending before the court without creating
the appearance of impropriety in at least the minds of those solicited? What
of the large companies who are always before the court? Can they refuse to
make a contribution when solicited by the judge's committee? One may argue that the judge is insulated from knowledge as to the source of funds.
The judge may well be insulated but one might seriously doubt whether the
public who is solicited either knows or believes that to be the fact. This is
particularly so when, even though a candidate is required to solicit funds
through a committee, the candidate nevertheless attends fundraising events
and sees who is present and who is absent. How does one who is not an
incumbent raise funds to challenge an incumbent sitting judge? How many
are so brave as to publicly acknowledge association with one who challenges
the sitting judge, knowing full well that in most jurisdictions public accountability laws makes their contribution a matter of public knowledge in short
time?
While collecting campaign funds before election is enough of a problem,
what of those instances when sufficient funds have not been collected before
election? Can a judge, even through a committee, collect funds to pay off a
campaign debt following election without creating the appearance of impropriety? Even though the merit selection system has a periodic retention vote
component, the judge stands for retention without the need of spending any
money in most instances. A jurisdiction that has a well-run, meaningful judicial qualifications commission and a meaningful, well-run public judicial
poll has all the tools it needs to remove those few judges who are not worthy
of remaining in office without subjecting all others to their loss of necessary
independence.
It is interesting to note that a Special Commission on the Administration
of Justice in Cook County, Illinois, created to conduct a wide-ranging study
of the state circuit court, in part as a result of the now famous "Graylord
Scandal," reports that "the time has come for a fundamental change in the
way judges are selected in Illinois. Nothing less will restore public confidence in our judicial system." 12 The report goes on to say: "We see three
defects with the current system:-Too many of the best qualified candidates
are not selected.-Judicial independence is undermined.-The election and
retention processes fail to provide meaningful accountability to the
13
public."
12.

SPECIAL COMMISSION ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN COOK COUNTY,

REPORT ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 1 (Oct. 1985).

13. Id.

A
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The report supports much of what has been suggested here. The report
further states:
Given the method o'f judicial selection in Cook County, it is not surprising that the testimony before our Commission indicates a serious lack of
judicial independence in Cook County. Along the way to the bench,
judicial candidates become embroiled in reciprocal obligations to political sponsors, ward and township committeemen, as well as to campaign contributors, many of whom are likely to be attorneys who will
appear before the judge. Too many judges feel obliged to return these
favors .... One aspect of judicial elections-campaign fundraisinghas a particularly corrosive effect upon public perceptions of judicial
independence. Even the requirement in Illinois that judicial candidates
must raise money through a campaign committee does not shield the
candidate from fundraising.... No matter how hard a judge may try to
be fair to contributors and non-contributors alike, the necessity and
practicalities of the campaign fundraising can only create the public
14
perception that judges will not be impartial.
One need only read this well-reasoned report, which comes out of a distressing situation, to recognize the benefits of the merit selection system and
the defects of an election system. The report concludes with the following
recommendation:
The Special Commission on the Administration of Justice in Cook
County recommends that associate and circuit judges of Circuit Courts
and all justices of the Appellate Courts and the Supreme Court be selected by a system in which a nominating commission recommends a
list of judicial candidates from which the Governor must appoint the
judges. Sitting judges would remain in office but be subject to new retention provisions when their terms of office expire .... We believe that
the adoption of our recommendations would result in more highly qual15
ified judges and greater judicial independence.
The only knowledgeable opponents of that report could be individuals who
either wish to have less qualified judges or wish to inhibit judicial independence. Yet, qualified, independent judges are critical to a quality judicial
system.
The notion of the importance of the independence of the judiciary is not
new. It has been recognized by everyone who has examined the system
throughout the years. The noted Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, writing
in his now famous Democracy in America, recognized it in 1831 when he
traveled what was then the whole of the United States. "Confederations
have existed in other countries beside America; and have not been established on the shores of the New World alone: the representative system of
government has been adopted in several states of Europe; but I am not aware
that any nation of the globe has hitherto organized a judicial power on the
principle adopted by the Americans."'16 He describes this independence of
the judiciary and its right to declare a law invalid if contrary to the constitu14. Id. at 1-3.
15. Id. at 5.
16.

1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 101 (4th ed. Philadelphia 1841).
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tion of the jurisdiction. The importance of that independence was further
stressed by former United States Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts when
he said,
When a man goes on the Court he ought not to have to depend upon
the strength ... of his own character to resist the temptation to shade a

sentence in an opinion or to shade a view. [He should not have] to put
an umbrella up in case it should rain. He ought to be free to say his say,
knowing, as the founding fathers meant he should know, that nothing
17
could reach him and that his conscience was as free as could be.
What was it the founding fathers intended? Alexander Hamilton, writing in
The Federalist, said:
The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited constitution. By a limited constitution I understand one
which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority;
such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post
facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in
practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice;
whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor
of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations
of particular
18
rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
Those who argue that judges should be popularly elected and, as a result,
subject to the will of the majority, fail to recognize that such a result would
be contrary to the purpose of an independent judiciary. If the goals of a
state judicial system are to attract and keep highly qualified individuals who
will impartially render justice and who will not succumb to the will of the
majority if that will is contrary to the law, then that jurisdiction must embrace a form of merit selection for its judiciary. Nothing else in present
society can so quickly assure that result.

17. Raven, Does the Bar Have an Obligation to Help Ensure the Independence of the Judiciary?, 69 JUDICATURE 66, 67 (1985) (quoting Justice Roberts).
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).

